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The key to the problems presented by Law and Psychologi-
cal Practice is revealed even before the reader reaches the
table of contents; it appears in that most innocuous of
sections-the acknowledgments. There, the authors-Rob-
ert L. and R. Kirkland Schwitzgebel, both veterans of the
traffic jam at the law/mental health intersection'-recognize
"the very valuable assistance" of an undergraduate student/
researcher who "composed the first draft of most of the
chapters of this book." (Acknowledgments) To emphasize
this is not to denigrate the researcher's apparently extensive
contributions, but rather to help explain the book's limita-
tions. The work reads exactly as it was described by its
authors: an attempt to synthesize and polish several only
vaguely related, high quality term papers. This is not neces-
sarily bad, of course, but it is something less than one might
expect from two authors with the credentials of the Schwitz-
gebels.
The authors seek "to lead human services professionals and
interested clients" (p. 1) through what is likely to be
unfamiliar legal processes, so as to help them "resolv[e]
conflicts or avoid . . . litigation in the areas of mental
health, criminal justice and social welfare." (p. 3) This is
clearly an ambitious goal, one which-if it is to be met
successfully-requires a significant amount of thematic or-
ganization and integration. Unfortunately, it is these very
characteristics that the book lacks.
Not that the authors have left out any subjects. They
cover-with varying degrees of accuracy, comprehensiveness
and perspicacity-the entire legal/mental health waterfront:
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civil commitment, patients' rights, prisoners' rights, punish-
ment, organic therapies, token economics, psychological
testing, school law, family law, and seven other important
areas. Reading the book, one inevitably conjures up a
picture of the authors (and their research assistant) sitting
around a table over a cup of coffee, and one of them saying,
"Gee, that's an interesting subject; let's add a chapter on
it." Perhaps that approach works in theory, but in this
instance, the whole is considerably less than the sum of its
parts.
As indicated above, the separate chapters are uneven. The
chapter on civil commitment law contains certain factual
errors: e.g., an emergency admission in New Jersey lasts 7
days, not 20 as suggested in the text. 2 This 13-day differen-
tial is not particularly crucial in shaping a reader's view of
mental health law, but it is the type of error (the misreading
of one statute and the bypassing of a companion law) that
suggests that the final editing was done more sloppily than
one would expect.
Similarly, in discussing burden of proof at commitment
hearings, the authors point out that there exists a range of
burdens applicable in the different states (p. 7), but note
that "the Supreme Court is considering a case that might
have wide impact on the standard of proof required-Ad-
dington v. Texas." (p. 19 n.9) Ordinarily, one would assume
that the time lag between preparation of the chapter and its
ultimate publication was such that it was impossible to add
even a short sentence on the court's ultimate decision in
Addington3 (which established the appropriate burden as "at
least 'clear and convincing evidence.' ,)4 However, the
authors do note briefly the Supreme Court's decision regard-
ing "voluntary" juvenile commitments in Parham v. J.R., I a
case decided 6 weeks after Addington.6 This lack of consis-
tency is more than sloppy style; it is sloppy substance.
More substantial factual errors taint the chapter on patients'
rights. The authors suggest that the right to treatment of
voluntary mental patients "has seldom, if ever, been directly
litigated." (p. 44) This is simply not so. Important class
action treatment/habilitation cases have clearly and squarely
included all patients-voluntary as well as involuntary-
within their scope.7 Further, the discussion of patient labor
in the chapter is marred by an overbroad reading of the
effect of National League of Cities v. Usery' on Souder v.
Brennan.9 Nothing in National League vitiates Souder with
regard to private facilities (not an insignificant popula-
tion);'" and more importantly, in spite of National League,
significant procedural due process considerations were ap-
plied to patient labor issues after Souder in the post Na-
tional League landmark case of Davis v. Balson, a decision
nowhere mentioned by the authors.' 2
Finally, the issue of refusal of medication is handled com-
paratively poorly by the authors. Although they note cor-
rectly that the subject area is a "thorny one" (p. 50) which is
in "development and flux," (p. 53) their characterization of
the pertinent question-"If a person is judged so mentally ill
that she/he has to be institutionalized, how can this person
be able to make a judgment regarding taking or not taking
certain drugs?" (p. 50)-reveals a serious misunderstanding
of the underlying constitutional premises controlling this
area. Both case law' 3 and statutes' emphasize that institu-
tionalization need not bespeak incompetence, especially in
the area of refusal of medication," where a host of other
important constitutional considerations-privacy, proce-
dural due process, freedom of thought, the least restrictive
alternative, and freedom from harm, among others-must
be carefully scrutinized. The undue-indeed, mistaken-
simplicity of the authors' rhetorical question is underscored
by the complexity of the subject matter.
Other chapters in the book fare better. The discussions of
such topics as punishment, organic therapies, psychological
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testing and behavioral research are comprehensive and help-
ful; it is probably no coincidence that these discussions are
based primarily on psychological and behavioral data
(rather than on legal analysis). Despite the authors' familiar-
ity with the legal process, they appear more comfortable
with the scientific method: this comfort is translated into
clearer and more cohesive chapters on topics depending
largely upon this method.
The book concludes with a "kitchen sink" collection of 41
appendices, ranging from a four-page glossary of legal terms
("hearsay" is defined; "expert witness" is not) to examples
of "consumer/therapist contracts." As one might guess, the
appendices are uneven both in emphasis and in quality;
some are excellent, others barely superficial.
In sum, the book is disappointing. When a topic as ambi-
tious as Law and Psychological Practice is dealt with, one
should be able to expect the presentation of some kind of
cosmic world view of the topic (especially given the fine
credentials of the authors). The lack of any specific point of
view and the authors' failure to integrate the material
presented meaningfully, help to explain why the book disap-
points. This is not to say that the book is a failure as a
reasonably helpful guide to the reader (especially one just
getting his/her feet wet in the whirlpools of mental health
law); it is just that it should have been so much more.
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